India's forex reserves at ~$710
billion look ample (covering ~11 months of imports), but quality matters more
than quantity:
Foreign Currency Assets (FCA)
erosion: Down to $555 billion from $621 billion in September 2024—a 10%+ drop.
FCA's share has shrunk to <78% from >90% pre-2020, limiting RBI's
dollar-selling firepower for interventions.
Gold dominance: Holdings up ~4x in
five years (now ~$70–80 billion equivalent at current prices), boosting total
reserves but illiquid for daily FX defence. RBI sold minimal gold historically;
it prefers spot USD.
Likely $80–100 billion now (official
data lags), tying up future dollars for importers/exporters. This amplifies
intervention costs without immediate liquidity. RBI data (weekly bulletins up
to March 2026) confirms these trends. Similar 2021–22 dips saw INR hit 80/USD
before a partial recovery.
External
and Domestic Triggers:
Current
account flip: Q4 surpluses (0.2–0.7% GDP) relied
on services exports ($110B+ annually) and remittances ($30B+ quarterly). Now,
trade deficit widened to $30B/month (oil at $75–80/barrel, imports up 15% YoY),
Middle East tensions cut remittances 5–10%, risking 1–2% GDP deficit.
Capital
outflows: FIIs pulled $10B+ in 2025 amid US
rate hikes (Fed funds at 4.5%) and global risk-off. India's 7%+ fiscal deficit
deters inflows.
REER
signal: Below 100 since mid-2025 (RBI
index), indicating overvaluation correction—INR "should" weaken 5–10%
for competitiveness, per BIS models.
Historical parallels: 2013 taper
tantrum (INR 68/USD), 2022 Ukraine shock (83/USD)—each saw 10–15% slides over
6–12 months.
India’s foreign exchange reserves
have dipped below $710 billion, falling from a recent high of over $728 billion
just weeks ago. On the surface, this still appears to be a comfortable buffer.
However, a deeper look at the structure of these reserves points to growing
vulnerabilities.
A key area of concern is Foreign
Currency Assets (FCA), which have declined to roughly $555 billion. This level
is not only lower than recent months but also below what India held back in
2021. Over time, the share of FCA in total reserves has steadily fallen to
under 78%, compared to more than 90% a few years ago. While rising gold prices
explain part of this shift, the drop in absolute FCA levels—around 10% lower
than in September 2024—highlights a more structural issue.
Adding to the pressure is the RBI’s
forward book, which has already exceeded $60 billion and may now be approaching
$100 billion. This reflects ongoing efforts to manage currency volatility but
also signals rising commitments in the market.
Externally, India’s position may
also weaken. The country recorded a current account surplus in the fourth
quarter over the past two years, supported by strong services exports and
steady remittances. This time, however, the outlook is less optimistic. A
widening trade deficit and softer remittance inflows—particularly due to
tensions in the Middle East, which contributes about 40% of such flows—could
push the current account back into deficit.
While further RBI intervention is
likely, its effectiveness has limits. It can help contain sharp volatility and
speculative movements, but it cannot fully counter persistent global pressures.
Continued foreign investor outflows and an unfavourable global environment
could keep the rupee under strain. This is the place where FII's are concerned about, and this does not attract them to invest in India. The biggest question is that despite the current sharp correction in very pockets, will FII's invest in India now? Unless the rupee gets into a stable form, the currency risk does not attract them. This also raises the risk of investments for DII's since they alone cannot keep the market alive for long. The SIP book might look attractive today, but it's not sustainable since, currently, every portfolio has wiped out the last 2 years' gains.
Coming to the rupee, if these trends continue, the rupee
could drift toward the 97–98 range against the US dollar. The real effective
exchange rate (REER), a measure of currency competitiveness, had already fallen
below 100 by mid-2025 after a prolonged period of overvaluation. Past
episodes—such as the oil price surges in 2007–08 and 2011–14—also saw extended
periods of rupee weakness.
In summary, while India’s reserves still offer a degree of protection, their shifting composition and external risks suggest that maintaining currency stability may become increasingly difficult in the near term.


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